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1 Introduction
The international community has come to recognize that fresh water is scarce, witness the
declarations at the Dublin Conference in 1992, the UN conference Johannesburg 2002 and
the past tri-annual World Water Forums starting in 1997 and its fourth meeting March
2006. It is generally felt that the problem is not so much physical scarcity, as ine¢ cient use
and resource management and vested interests, in particular in case of the Worlds many
international rivers. In some regions, ooding and pollution pose serious threats, whereas
in water stressed regions, lack of agreement on how to share river waters and underground
aquifers are a serious source of potentially violent conict.2
International water law, i.e. the Helsinki Rules of 1966 and the UN Convention on the
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses of 1997, does not recognize
claims by upstream countries of owing the water caught on its territory (absolute territorial
sovereignty), conscating headwaters by geopolitics or downstream nations claims of histor-
ical rights(unlimited territorial integrity), see e.g., Ambec and Sprumont (2002). Rather,
international law states that the nations involved should mutually agree on sharing the river
through negotiations, but it is left in the middle to what extend unilateral decisions can be
made in the absence of agreement. Such negotiations are often deadlocked, because almost
all governments in water stressed regions became aware of the water issues after having
experienced serious shortages of water and a simple reshu­ ing of water is perceived as a
zero sumgame where giving up water is regarded as unacceptable. Unless politics either
deepen or broaden the water agenda, the situation is most likely to stay put or might even
deteriorate ending in conict.
Coalition formation, the division of gains within coalitions and unilateral decisions prior
to the negotiations, threats traditionally belong to the realm of game theory, which is also
recognized by global institutions involved in river management such as the World Bank, e.g.
2See e.g. UNESCOs initiative "PC ! CP From Potential Conict to Cooperative Potential",
http://webworld.unesco.org/water/wwap/pccp/cd/pccp_publications.html
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Carraro et al. (2005a,b). These references also contain an extensive overview of the many
documented researches in economics and game theory addressing the water issue. However,
these surveys also recognize that there are only three applications of formal negotiation
theory in which negotiation procedures are explicitly modelled: Rausser and Simon (1992),
Thoyer et al. (2001) and Simon et al. (2001). In these three references, a nite horizon
is taken as a proxy for the xed-point problem characterizing the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of their innite-horizon bargaining game, because numerically solving xed-point
problems is computationally di¢ cult.
Although it is eminent that game theory o¤ers a methodology to address water issues,
the game theoretic profession did not seem to respond to the critique in Dinar et al. (1992):
stakeholders and policy makers are reluctant to game-theoretic transfers that are not related
to water prices and, second, game theoretic solutions impose a huge computational burden
upon the applied modeler. The computational burden in water issues arises because the
physical economic problem has to be transformed into the so-called utility-space, repre-
sented by the characteristic function form, before any of the game theoretic concepts can be
applied and, then, requires a translation back into the original physical formulation. Also
the computation of game theoretic concepts in utility space, especially xed-point problems,
adds to the complexity. This criticism still stands today.3
The rst critique goes beyond the lack of water prices. Since most existing international
treaties, such as the Jordan-Israeli Peace Accords of 1994, are formulated in terms of minimal
transboundary ows, water quality and nancial transfers, this hints at that the framing of
negotiation theory should be preferably close to physical variables and notions understood
by negotiation parties. Roemer (1988) was among the rst to demonstrate how our under-
standing of two axiomatic bargaining solutions, including the one proposed in Nash (1950),
benets from taking physical reality as the primitive.
Recent theoretical work by Houba (2005a,b) for the alternating-o¤ers model in Rubin-
3Personal communication with professor Dinar during Game Theory Practice 2006.
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stein (1982) provides a promising way to e¤ectively deal with the critique in Dinar et al.
(1992). The bilateral case seems restrictive, but extends to multilateral negotiations requir-
ing unanimity among all parties. The innovations are twofold.
First, the xed-point problem characterizing the equilibrium proposals in the alternating-
o¤ers model is formulated directly in terms of physical variables and can be solved by com-
puting the optimum of a single maximization problem for which excellent software is avail-
able.4 Of course, every xed point problem f(x) = x can be reformulated as minimization of
(f (x)  x)2 and this square is minimized at every xed point x of the function f . However,
even for relatively small problems such procedure is known to be numerically cumbersome
and might not produce any solution at all. The innovation in Houba (2005a,b) is a dif-
ferent reformulation that does allow for a robust numerical implementation. Furthermore,
this method is computationally superior to methods relying on truncating the horizon. The
objective of the single program is the same asymmetric Nash product as rst reported in
Binmore et al. (1986) for instantaneously fast negotiations and this insight therefore extends
to time-consuming or sluggish negotiations. The bargaining weights provide a theoretical
measure for bargaining power in sluggish negotiations.
Second, this single program generates the player-dependent Pareto-e¢ cient proposals.
Therefore, the Second Welfare Theorem applies: Every Pareto e¢ cient allocation can be
regarded as a Walrasian equilibrium with Walrasian market prices and suitable nancial
transfers. This provides a sound underpinning of the game theoretic solution in terms of
water prices. Moreover, for every equilibrium proposals, these Walrasian prices coincide
with the shadow prices in the optimal solution of the single program and these prices are
automatically generated by the optimization software. The suitable nancial transfers are
equal to the di¤erence in monetary value of the disagreement situation and the situation
arising from agreement, both evaluated against the market prices. These transfers can
be interpreted as transfers of property rights. This interpretation is well understood in
4For example, GAMS is popular in applied economics, see www.gams.com.
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General Equilibrium models, but novel to game theory. Applied General Equilibrium (AGE)
modelling is popular in applied economics and formulated in physical variables that are
close to the policy makers concerns and understanding. The AGE framework is exible
to accommodate sectors or regions in and across economies as well as extensions involving
uncertainty and dynamics, see e.g., Ginsburgh and Keyzer (2002). Therefore, this framework
is of relevance in modelling water related problems, as will be demonstrated for the bilateral
version of the river basin management model proposed in Ambec and Sprumont (2002).
Finally, this reinterpretation of Pareto e¢ ciency assumes non-transferable utility in dealing
with the negotiation problem instead of the more restrictive transferable utility
This paper discusses the relevance of the results obtained for exchange economies in
Houba (2005a,b) in dealing with the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992). First,
the results for exchange economies are surveyed in Section 2. Then, production is added
in the subsequent section. The Second Welfare Theorem, Walrasian equilibrium prices and
transfers of property rights are discussed in Section 4. The bilateral version of the river basin
model in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) in Section 5 serves as an illustration of the type of
insights available for river basin management. Directions for future research are delegated
to the nal section.
2 Alternating O¤ers and the Single Program
The well-known alternating-o¤ers model in Rubinstein (1982) is formulated in terms of the
division of a single dollar or single issue. It is a standard result that, under certain as-
sumptions, this model admits a unique SPE in stationary strategies in which the responding
player is kept indi¤erent between accepting the equilibrium proposal and the equilibrium
continuation after rejection. Furthermore, the assumption of a single issue can be easily
replaced by simultaneous negotiations on multiple issues, for example consumption bundles
in an exchange economy.
The alternating-o¤ers model also allows for an interpretation of negotiations over an
5
innite stream of single dollars with discounting under stationary contracts, as pioneered by
Fernandez and Glazer (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990) for wage bargaining. Recently,
Houba and Wen (2006) point out that the Pareto frontier under an innite stream of dollars
and heterogeneous time preferences is supported by nonstationary contracts in which the
impatient player obtains zero in the long run. Such contracts seem too unrealistic and
the economic modeler has to impose restrictions upon the feasible divisions of such streams.
Stationary contracts represent just one of many choices and such contracts impose a constant
division over time that are by default Pareto ine¢ cient.
For river basin management, the interpretation in terms of an everlasting stream of sur-
pluses is appropriate, because rivers typically are renewable resources that are exploited by
its users over time. Reservoirs such as lakes, dams, cisterns or aquifers are of relevance
in river basin management and these require the introduction of stock variables that link
subsequent economies. However, we postpone such variables until Remark 2 in Section 5.
Even with stock variables, stationary contracts seem appropriate because many international
agreements specify minimal annual river ows or cost sharing of annual operation and main-
tenance costs of operating installed infrastructure. Nonstationary contracts are dealt with
in Remark 1 in Section 3.
To establish minimal notation, we consider an extension of the alternating-o¤ers model
in Rubinstein (1982) in which each of two agents discounts his per-period utility from a
sequence of consumption bundles in an innite stream of exchange economies (without stock
variables). The exchange economy consists of two agents, called countries, are indexed
i = 1; 2. The economy has n  2 commodities, monotonic and concave utility functions
ui : Rn+ ! R, i = 1; 2, a vector of initial endowments !i 2 Rn+ for country i and total
endowments ! = !1 + !2 > 0.5 A feasible allocation is denoted as z = (z1; z2), z1; z2 2 Rn+,
such that z1 + z2  !. We assume that z = (!1; !2) is Pareto ine¢ cient meaning that
5We could allow for !1+!2  ! that would describe cases where cumulative property rights over several
underdeveloped resources are less than is physically feasible. For example, the Israeli-Jordan Peace Treaty
of 1994 further develops the excess seasonal ows of the Yarmuck River.
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the bargaining problem below is essential. Exchange economies form a special class of AGE
models, see e.g., Ginsburgh and Keyzer (2002).
We regard exchange economies as multi-issue negotiation problems. Initial endowments
or property rights are typically ill-dened in river basin management. In Section 5, we
address the origin of these initial endowments in such situations and, until then, we assume
these are given. The feasibility constraint is better known as the aggregate commodity balance
and, whenever embedded in the single program, its shadow prices will play an important
role in the application of the Second Welfare Theorem discussed in Section 4. In river basin
management, it includes the so-called water balances that are determined by the hydrological
experts, see e.g., Albersen et al. (2003).
Time is discrete and indexed by t 2 N. The feasible allocation in period t is denoted as
zt = (z1;t; z2;t). The subject of the negotiations is a feasible allocation z = (z1; z2) that should
be understood as an everlasting, binding and stationary contract, i.e., f(z1; ; z2;t)g1=0 with
zi; = zi for both i and period  = 0 being the rst period that the contract is implemented.
In every period t 2 N prior to agreement, each country consumes zi;t = !i. This means that
country is disagreement utility is given by di = ui (!i), i = 1; 2. Country is utility from
T  0 periods of disagreement followed by agreement on z = (z1; z2) is given by 
1  Ti

di + 
T
i ui
 
zi

;
where i 2 (0; 1) is country is discount factor. Furthermore, each constraint is binding.
At t odd, country 1 proposes the feasible allocation and, then, country 2 accepts or
rejects. Accept ends the negotiations. If rejected, then each country i consumes !i before
the negotiations move to the next (even) round. At t even, the countriesroles are reversed.
The equilibrium concept is subgame perfectness (SPE).
It is a well-known result that the alternating o¤ers model admits a unique SPE in station-
ary strategies (SSPE), see for a survey e.g., Muthoo (1999) and Houba and Bolt (2002). Sta-
tionary strategies prescribe country-dependent feasible allocations denoted as x = (x1; x2),
respectively, y = (y1; y2) for country 1 and 2. In such SSPE, accept y is a best response for
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country 1 if and only if u1 (y1)  (1  1) d1+1u1 (x1). Similarly, accept x is a best response
for country 2 if and only if u2 (x2)  (1  2) d2+ 2u2 (y2). Taking these equilibrium condi-
tions and the feasibility constraints into account, we have that any pair of SSPE allocations
(x; y) simultaneously solves the following pair of convex programs as a xed point:
x = argmax
z
u1
 
z1

; (1)
s.t. z1 + z2  !; u2
 
z2
  (1  2) d2 + 2u2  y2 ;
y = argmax
z
u2
 
z2

; (2)
s.t. z1 + z2  !; u1
 
z1
  (1  1) d1 + 1u1  x1 ;
where y2, respectively, x1 are exogenous in (1) and (2). Both x and y are Pareto e¢ cient.
Of greater signicance is the equivalence between any xed point (x; y) of (1)-(2) and the
solution to a single convex program, as rst established in Houba (2005b). The equivalence
is based upon the observation that any pair of SSPE allocations, the proposed allocations
x and y have the same asymmetric Nash product associated with the bargaining weight
 = ln 2= (ln 1 + ln 2)
 1 for country 1. To see this, note that
 
u1
 
x1
  d1  u2  x2  d21  = 1  u1  x1  d1  u2  y2  d21  ;
and, because ln 21 = e
(ln 1)ln 2 = ln 12 ,
 
u1
 
y1
  d1  u2  y2  d21  = 1  u1  x1  d1  u2  y2  d21  :
This asymmetric Nash product is the objective function in the single program. The con-
straints in the single program are obtained by combining the constraints in (1) and (2).
However, a minor modication is needed, because the endogeniety of both y2 and x1 in each
second inequality constraint in (1) and (2) would violate the convexity of the program. The
convexity can be restored by introducing the additional variables si, i = 1; 2, replacing the
utility functions u1 (x1) and u2 (y2) in these constraints and the Nash product at the costs
of adding the additional constraints s2  u2 (y2) and s1  u1 (x1). Then, the single convex
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program is given by
max
sd;x;y
(s1   d1) (s2   d2)1  ; (3)
s.t.
s1  u1 (x1)
s2  u2 (y2)
(1  1) d1 + 1s1  u1 (y1) ;
(1  2) d2 + 2s2  u2 (x2) ;
x1 + x2  !; (px)
y1 + y2  !; (py)
where px and py denote vectors of shadow prices. The following result states the equivalence
of the xed point (1) and (2) with program (3), which is the main result in Houba (2005b).
Proposition 1 (s1; s

2; x
; y) is a solution of (3) if and only if (x; y) = (x; y) is a pair of
SSPE allocations to (1)-(2).
Remark 1 Reinterpretation of the n commodities in (3) can represent nonstationary con-
tracts. Suppose the k-th component represents consumption of, say, water or money at period
k. Then, the contract distinguishes consumption of a single commodity in n di¤erent peri-
ods. A normalized and constant stream of this single commodity would correspond to !k = 1.
Discounted utility over these n periods can be captured by introducing some per-period utility
function u^i : R+ ! R and redening the utility function ui (zi) as
Pn
k=1 
k
i u^i (z
i
k). This would
also allow for restrictions on the contract space through additional constraints. For example,
stationarity imposes zik = z
i
1 for all k, or limiting the growth of country is consumption over
time to a maximum of   100 percent imposes zik+1  (1 + )zik for all k. Many of such
restrictions preserve the convexity of the program.
In the optimum, all constraints are binding. Therefore, s1 = u1 (x
1) and s2 = u2 (y
2)
imply that the additional variables represent the SSPE utility levels for country i in the
role of the proposer. Since the program is convex, the Maximum Theorem implies that
the shadow prices px and py are nonnegative. Program (3) lends itself for implementation in
many of the optimization packages available today, such as e.g., GAMS. Since this program is
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convex, these packages o¤er robust computational algorithms designed to e¢ ciently compute
an accurate numerical approximation of the unique optimum. This almost exact numerical
solution is superior to approximation of the xed point of (1)-(2) through a T -period nite
horizon truncation that involves solving a sequence of T single programs of n variables and n
linear constraints being either (1) or (2). Rausser and Simon (1992), Thoyer et al. (2001) and
Simon et al. (2001) assume a random proposer at the nal bargaining round that eliminates
the deadline e¤ect and speeds up the convergence.
The single program states the formula for the Nash bargaining solution for all parameter
values 1 and 2 in a modied exchange economy of "double" size. It also generalizes the
well-known result in Binmore et al. (1986) for instantaneous negotiations to time-consuming
sluggish negotiations. Instantaneous negotiations correspond to taking the limit of vanishing
time between bargaining rounds. Formally, let  > 0 denote the time between any two sub-
sequent bargaining rounds and consider discount factors equal to 1 and 

2 . Vanishing time
means taking the limit  goes to 0, i.e., lim!0 

1 = lim!0 

2 = 1. Then, instantaneous
negotiations correspond to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and feature x = y.
Therefore, these can be implemented by less variables and constraints and solved as
max
z
 
u1
 
z1
  d1  u2  z2  d21  ; s.t. z1 + z2  !: (4)
So, the additional computational costs, in terms of additional variables and constraints, of
solving (3) for sluggish negotiations instead of (4) for instantaneous negotiations amounts to
n+ 2 variables and n+ 4 constraints, of which n are linear.
The bargaining problem in utility representation
Houba (2005a) establishes similar results for convex bargaining problems in the utility
representation. This has relevant theoretical value, because every bilateral negotiation prob-
lem that can be transformed into such convex bargaining problem can also be solved with
a single convex program. Furthermore, it also provides valuable insights for non-convex
bargaining problems.
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Formally, a bargaining problem in utility representation is denoted as the pair (S; d) with
S 2 R2 the nonempty, compact set of feasible utility pairs and d 2 S the disagreement point.
The curve si = fi (sj), i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j, describes the Pareto frontier of S.
Any pair (s1; s

2) of SSPE utilities simultaneously solves the following pair of programs
as a xed point:
s1 = argmax
sd
s1, s.t. s1  f1 (s2) ; s2  (1  2) d2 + 2s2; (5)
s2 = argmax
sd
s2, s.t. s2  f2 (s1) ; s1  (1  1) d1 + 1s1: (6)
Each program implies that the proposing country maximizes his own utility among the set of
feasible and acceptable utility pairs. In each optimum, both constraints are binding. Houba
(2005a) establishes the following result for convex bargaining problems (S; d):
Proposition 2 Let S be a convex set. Then, (s1; s

2) is the unique pair of SSPE utilities of
(5-(6) if and only if
(s1; s

2) = argmax
sd
(s1   d1) (s2   d2)1  ; (7)
s.t. s1  f1 ((1  2) d2 + 2s2) ;
s2  f2 ((1  1) d1 + 1s1) :
This proposition partly extends to the class of bargaining problems in utility representa-
tion that are strongly comprehensive or non-convexas in Herrero (1989). Then, Program
(7) always yields a pair of SSPE allocations, because in the optimum both constraints are
binding. However, the reverse may not hold as Herrero (1989) shows: Uniqueness of the pair
of SSPE utilities (s1; s

2) may break down and multiple non-stationary SPE strategies may
exist as well. The Nash product associated to di¤erent pairs of SSPE utility pairs (s1; s

2) are
also di¤erent and may be less than the maximal attainable Nash product. For instantaneous
negotiations, the (limit) pair of SSPE utilities (s1; s

2) in program (7) coincides with the max-
imal Nash product as axiomatized in Kaneko (1980). The limit set of all SSPE utilities of
(5)-(6) is axiomatized in Herrero (1989). What is needed for uniqueness in (non-stationary)
SPE strategies is the stronger uniqueness in xed points of (5)-(6).
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3 Production
The results for exchange economies might seem of limited interest for applied economics.
The aim of this and later sections is to show the merits in applications. In this section, we
address how to incorporate production.
Extending the exchange economy to allow for production activities is conceptually straight-
forward, see e.g. Varian (1984). Production plans require inputs from the economy in order
to produce outputs. These are represented in a single vector q 2 Rn with positive and neg-
ative elements, where positive (negative) elements represent outputs (inputs). Production
technologies are often represented by the so-called production set Q  Rn that represents all
technologically feasible input-output combinations. Often, production sets are represented
by transformation functions. In our case, transformation functions more naturally t the
optimization framework. The function F : Rn ! R is a transformation function representing
Q if q 2 Q if and only if F (q)  0. E¢ cient production corresponds to the =-sign. The
possibility of inaction and no free lunch translate into F (0) = 0. The technology is convex
if the function F is quasi-convex. Otherwise, the technology is called nonconvex.
Since we later discuss bilateral river basin management in which the economy of each
riparian country involves water related production, we assume that water related production
is carried out by many small producers that are mainly active in one country. For explanatory
reasons, we aggregate all producers in one country by assuming one production set for each
country.6 So, each country exclusively controls some production technology and country is
production plan is a vector qi 2 Qi. The subject of the negotiations becomes a feasible
allocation z = (z1; z2; q1; q2) meaning that
z1; z2 2 Rn+; q1 2 Q1; q2 2 Q2 and z1 + z2  ! + q1 + q2;
where negative components of either q1 or q2 lower the amount of that particular good
available for consumption. The aggregate commodity balance implies that the demand for
6If not, we would have the index set Ji of producers in country i and qj 2 Qj for every j 2 Ji. In the
text, we assume Ji = fig.
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each good is at most equal to its supply. In that respect, it would be natural to also
include the demand for inputs on the left-hand side, but it is standard to have one vector
per producer representing the possibly negative net output on the right-hand side of this
balance. As mentioned, we describe country is production set Qi by the transformation
function Fi meaning qi 2 Qi if and only if Fi (qi)  0.
In case of convex production technologies, we immediately have that the bargaining
problem in utility representation is also convex, see e.g., Roemer (1988), and, hence, the
equivalence stated in Proposition 2 immediately applies. Also in terms of the economic
environment, the equivalence between the xed point problem and program (3) remains in
tact, where the single program remains convex. Including (convex) production per country
requires the following modications to the alternating-o¤ers model, where we add an addi-
tional superscript x and y to the production plans to distinguish between country 1s and
2s proposal. The modications to program (1) imply rewriting the commodity balance and
adding both transformation functions such that the modied program includes the following
constraints:
x1 + x2  ! + qx;1 + qx;2; F1
 
qx;1
  0 and F2  qx;2  0:
Similar, the modied program (2) includes the following constraints:
y1 + y2  ! + qy;1 + qy;2; F1
 
qy;1
  0 and F2  qy;2  0:
Of course, these modications must also be made to obtain the modied program (3), which
we omit.
Nonconvex production technologies can be implemented in the same manner. However,
such technologies cause a breakdown of the convexity of the modied program (3), because
such technologies are known to give rise to nonconvex bargaining problem in utility rep-
resentation. As argued for the utility representation in Section 2, the theoretical results
only partly extend. Its counterpart for program (3) with nonconvex production reads: The
maximum of the modied single program (3) corresponds to one of possibly multiple SSPE
13
strategies. The SSPE specied by this program is special in that it has the largest Nash
product.
The modied program (3) with production can also be implemented in optimization soft-
ware by modifying all commodity balances and adding twice (i.e., once for each proposal) all
variables and constraints concerning production. Under convex production technologies, the
software returns the unique optimum. However, for nonconvex programs it is fundamentally
unclear whether a local or global optimum is found, even though most packages o¤er robust
algorithms. Nevertheless, although this is a fundamental problem of any numeric optimiza-
tion, it will be clear that the numerical solution returned, whether it is the global or a local
optimum, has properties that are consistent with SSPE behavior.
4 Market Prices and Property Rights
This paper is motivated by the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992), who report on
the di¢ culties arising from applying cooperative game theory to several small-scale water
issues. They state: "Clearly, the potential for additional income due to cooperation is higher
when side payments are possible. However, the soundness of such transfers with no a prior
reference to the price per unit of water may be questioned, especially considering the general
resentment of farmers to adopt side payments as a policy." Since side payments or transfers
are advocated by (cooperative) Game Theory as the universal remedy towards cooperation,
the game theoretic society should treat this critique very seriously.
In this section, we discuss the merits of the Second Welfare Theorem in General Equi-
librium modelling in dealing with this fundamental issue. Since (cooperative) game theory
developed autonomously from microeconomics, it does not refer to nor does it exploit the
implications of the Second Welfare Theorem. For that reason, we discuss these implications
in detail before turning our attention to bilateral river basin management in the next section.
The Second Welfare Theorem for economies with production states: Any Pareto e¢ cient
allocation is attainable as a price quasi-equilibrium or Walrasian equilibrium with transfers,
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see e.g., Varian (1984), Mas-Colell et al. (1995) and Ginsburgh and Keyzer (2002). Mas-
Colell et al. (1995) show that this theorem holds under convex and locally nonsatiated
preferences and convex production technologies. The transfers can be achieved through
many appropriate physical reallocations of the initial endowments or through nancial lump-
sum transfers evaluated against the Walrasian equilibrium prices. In terms of a Walrasian
economy, these transfers take place before price-taking behavior by all agents and such
behavior ensures that the law of supply and demand will lead to the Walrasian equilibrium
prices supporting the Pareto e¢ cient allocation under consideration. The Walrasian prices
can also be obtained as the shadow prices of a welfare program. The single program (3) can
be seen as a welfare program associated with the Nash social welfare function as axiomatized
in Kaneko (1982). The implication to water management is clear: Pareto e¢ cient allocations
can be reinterpreted in terms of lump-sum nancial transfers and supporting water prices.
In further discussing these issues, we consider country 1s SSPE proposal (x?1; x?2; q?x;1; q?x;2)
and assume that it is part of the optimum of the modied Program (3) with the vector of
shadow prices p?x. The allocation (x?1; x?2; q?x;1; q?x;2) is feasible and, being a SSPE pro-
posal, is Pareto e¢ cient, see Houba (2005b). The shadow prices p?x can be regarded as
the Walrasian equilibrium prices and these prices clear all the markets: aggregate demand
x?1+x?2 equals aggregate (net) supply !+ q?x;1+ q?x;2. Valued against p?x, country is allo-
cated consumption x?i is worth p?x x?i and can be regarded as country is expenditure on all
goods. This expenditure is nanced from this countrys market income obtained from selling
against p?x its endowments !i and producing qi 2 Qi. This income is worth p?x !i+p?x q?i.
In general, a countrys allocated (or allowed) expenditure and its market income will not
be equal and this means that either a country is allowed to expend more than it earns, or
less. This di¤erence can be interpreted as country is implicitly received lump-sum subsidy,
or tax levied on this country. Formally, in country 1s SSPE proposal, country i receives the
net lump-sum transfer T i = p
?x  x?i   p?x  !i   p?x  q?i, which is a subsidy if positive and
a tax if negative. Pre-tax market income is equal to p?x  !i + p?x  q?i and after-tax market
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income is m?i = p?x  !i + p?x  q?i  Ti = p?x  x?i. Note that in the optimum of the modied
program (3) there is a balanced budget for the ctitious tax authority. This follows directly
from the aggregate commodity balance that appears as px  (x1 + x2   qx;1   qx;2   !) in the
Lagrangian of the optimization problem and this term is equal to 0 in the optimum.
In the Walrasian equilibrium all trade is voluntary and the markets respect property
rights in the sense that, valued against the Walrasian equilibrium prices, each consumers
expenditure is equal to his market income. Formally, T ?i = 0 in a Walrasian equilibrium.
In any SSPE agreement, each countrys expenditure and post-tax income satises the same
property, but from moving from pre-tax to post-tax market income a change in property
rights occurs valued T ?i that is most likely di¤erent from zero. In the context of negotiations,
the countries are rational and any agreement is reached on a voluntary basis. So, any such
voluntary agreed upon contract implies agreement upon a redistribution of property rights.
As mentioned, the Pareto e¢ cient allocation (x?1; x?2; q?x;1; q?x;2) can be thought of as
arising from aWalrasian economy in which all parties act as price takers. Country i behaving
as a price-taking consumer facing market prices p?x and having after-tax incomem?i = p?xx?i
solves
x?i = argmax
xi0
ui
 
xi

; s.t. p?x  xi  m?i;
where we take uniqueness of the maximizer for granted. So, country i acting as a price-
taking consumer voluntarily purchases x?i such that rui (x?i) = p?x, where rui denotes the
gradient of ui in case of di¤erentiability. Monotonicity of the utility function guarantees
p?x  xi = m?i. This latter condition should also be fullled in the rst-order conditions of
the modied program (3). As mentioned, for convex programs the shadow prices px (and py)
are nonnegative. This result generalizes to economies with non-convex production, because
then the monotonicity of the utility functions guarantees the non-negativity of p?x and p?y
through p?x = rui (x?i)  0 and p?y = rui (y?i)  0.
Similar to the Robinson Crusoe economy, country i is also producer i. Country i behaving
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as a price-taking producer facing market prices p?x solves
q?x;i = argmax
qx;i
p?x  qx;i; s.t. Fi
 
qx;i
  0;
where we once more take uniqueness for granted.7 Similar as before, country i as a price-
taking producer voluntarily chooses the production plan q?i such that rFi (qx;i) = p?x, which
should also be fullled by the rst-order conditions of the modied program (3). Under
convex production, rm i always makes a nonnegative prot that accrues to consumer is
pre-tax market income. However, nonnegative prots are not automatically ensured under
non-convexities. Then, we need to modify the prot maximization problem taking into
account a lump-sum producers subsidy S?i =  p?x  q?x;i  0 received by producer i to
favour the producers decision towards q?x;i instead of inaction at qx;i = 0. Of course, proper
accounting requires that producerss subsidies and consumers subsidies are counted just
once. The producer subsidy S?i ensures that consumer i receives a net prot of 0 from
operating the production plant, but this consumer pays for S?i through T
?
i , which requires a
minor adjustment of the national accounts.
To summarize, since each SSPE proposal is Pareto e¢ cient it can be supported by Wal-
rasian equilibrium prices as an immediate consequence of the Second Welfare Theorem. The
associated Walrasian equilibrium prices are the shadow prices of the single program (3) and
these resolve the lack of (water) prices. Although shadow prices are implicitly present in
transforming the physical economy into the (often transferable) utility representation in game
theoretic applications, their presence seems to be ignored. Also the richer interpretation of
agreements in terms of reallocation of property rights remains behind a veil when taking the
utility representation as the primitive of the analysis. In negotiations, parties benet from
voluntarily agreeing upon a redistribution of property rights, even in the absence of such
rights as will be clear from the next section.
The Walrasian equilibrium prices suggest the possibility to decentralize all consumer
7Under constant returns to scale, the Walrasian equilibrium prices are such that the rms make zero
prot and then a set of maximizers exists.
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and producer decisions through markets and suitable taxation. In river basin management,
introducing water markets is often advocated as a solution to inadequate water management.
Of course, whether it is advisable to do so should depend upon whether or not these agents
have market power to manipulate market prices, which is a separate matter and outside the
realm of the Walrasian model.
5 Bilateral Joint River Basin Management
The previous sections established that the single program can be implemented in economies
with production and that each SSPE proposal can be interpreted as a Walrasian equilibrium
with equilibrium prices. In this section, we illustrate the potentials of this framework to
bilateral river basin management in a two-country version of the model proposed in Ambec
and Sprumont (2002).
Consider a river that runs through two countries, where country 1 lies upstream of country
2 and all water users within the same country are aggregated as a single consumer. A more
detailed model would allow for explicit production and water users that di¤er in their spatial
location, representing di¤erent regions or cities, and di¤er in their use, such as agriculture,
industrial and domestic. The territory of country i, i = 1; 2, captures ei > 0 of water
that is available for use. The subject of the negotiations concerns the allocation of water
and an explicit nancial transfer. Therefore, each country derives utility from consuming
water and from holding money. Country is utility from consuming zi of water and the
possibly negative transfer ti is given by ui (zi; ti) = bi (zi) + ti, where bi is monotonically
increasing, homogenous (bi (0) = 0), di¤erentiable and strictly concave. The function bi can
also be regarded as an implicitly described production technology that can be separated as
described in Section 4 at the cost of an additional variable and constraint. Following Ambec
and Sprumont (2002), money is transferred utility meaning that the two-country economy
does not have initial holdings of money. Total endowments are ! = (e1; e2; 0).
In terms of economic goods, the model distinguishes between good 1 representing water
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that is physically located in country 1, good 2 representing water located in country 2 and
good 3 representing money. In Walrasian economies, each consumer expresses a demand
for each of the available goods, but in case of rivers country 1 cannot consume good 2 and
country 2 cannot consume good 1. To minimize on subscripts and superscripts, we continue
denoting country is consumption of good i simply as zi.
Since water disposed of by country 1 ows downhill and transforms good 1 into good 2
we should see the river as a giant production process governed by physical processes. In the
model under consideration, the river accumulates e2 on country 2s territory and, therefore,
the river production of downhill water between "locations" 1 and 2 takes place on country
1s territory. So, it is country 1 that produces good 2 with good 1 as input. Although some
countries spend a signicant proportion of the gross national income on pumping water
uphill, such as Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan, we refrain from pumping as in Ambec and
Sprumont (2002). We only note that pumping should be treated as a production process.
In the present setup, country 2 cannot produce good 1.
With respect to production of good 2, country 1 produces q2 from input q1 and, under
costless transformation, we have q1 + q2  0 and q1  0, which implies a convex production
technology. The aggregate commodity balance is given by
z1  e1 + q1 (p1)
z2  e2 + q2 (p2)
t1 + t2  0; (p3)
(8)
where p1, p2 and p3 refer to the shadow prices for the three goods. Consumption of z1  e1
by country 1 and e¢ ciency in production implies q2 =  q1 = e1 z1  0. Substitution yields
the mathematically equivalent feasibility constraints in Ambec and Sprumont (2002):
z1  e1; (p1)
z2  e2 + e1   z1; (p2)
t1 + t2  0; (p3)
(9)
In terms of the latter balance, the subject of the negotiations is a feasible allocation (z1; z2; t1; t2).
The allocation should be extended to also include q1 and q2 if river "production" is explicitly
incorporated, which is would be the convenient approach in applications where the hydro-
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Figure 1: The bargaining frontier, the disagreement point (b (e1) ; b2 (e2)) and the set of
individual rational payo¤s (IR). The aspiration levels (b (e1) ; b2 (e1 + e2)) are infeasible.
logical part of the model is provided by hydrologists.8
The disagreement point
An essential ingredient of any bargaining problem is the disagreement point. For water
issues, there is some modelling freedom in the choice of such point. An obvious choice is a
disagreement point based upon property rights according to international law. An alternative
choice for the disagreement point would be to assumes that this point is based upon the
countriesunilateral decisions concerning water issues. We discuss both alternatives.
Suppose in modeling water issues we opt for a disagreement point based upon interna-
tional law. As Ambec and Sprumont (2002) argue, international law is ambiguous and they
discuss two conicting doctrines. One of these doctrines is absolute territorial sovereignty
and it assigns ei as the property rights for country i and the rivers production technology
to country 1. This would imply !1 = (e1; 0; 0), !2 = (0; e2; 0) and the disagreement point
d = (b1 (e1) ; b2 (e2)). This point is always feasible, because
b1 (e1) + b2 (e2)  max
z12[0;e1]
b1 (z1) + b2 (e1 + e2   z1) : (10)
In order to have an essential bargaining problem, the inequality has to be strict. Another
8In terms of Section 4, we have z1 = (z1; 0; t1), q1 = (q1; q2; 0) 2 Q1 =

q1 jq1  0; q2   q1j
	
, z2 =
(0; z2; t2) and q2 2 Q2 = f0g.
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doctrine is unlimited territorial integrity that assigns incompatible property rights to the
countries, namely e1 to country 1 and e1 + e2 to country 2. Also, the rivers production
technology accrues to country 2. This would translate into !1 = (e1; 0; 0), !2 = (0; e1 + e2; 0)
and the disagreement point d = (b1 (e1) ; b2 (e1 + e2)). This point is not feasible, because
b1 (e1) + b2 (e1 + e2) > max
z12[0;e1]
b1 (z1) + b2 (e1 + e2   z1) : (11)
This disagreement point is physically unattainable and, as suggested by Ambec and Spru-
mont (2002), can only be interpreted as the countriesaspiration levels. In case both countries
are committed to these "virtual" aspiration levels, then the negotiations remain deadlocked
and disagreement is the only outcome, see e.g. Crawford (1982) and Muthoo (1992). Figure
1 illustrates both doctrines.
As an alternative modelling approach that seems closer to reality, we may assume that
each country takes unilateral decisions concerning water issues in the absence of bilateral river
basin management. In terms of noncooperative bargaining theory, the disagreement point is
endogenous. Several theoretical models are available, see e.g. Bolt and Houba (1998), Busch
and Wen (1995) and Houba (1997).9 These bargaining models also assume the model under
consideration as the disagreement game in which both countries take unilateral decisions.
Under SSPE behavior and the impossibility of commitment to disagreement actions prior
to the negotiations, the disagreement point coincides with a Nash equilibrium, which is
(zi; ti) = (ei; 0), i = 1; 2, in our case. This Nash equilibrium coincides with absolute territorial
sovereignty. Although international law suggests that countries should mutually agree on
Pareto improvements through negotiations, this law seems to lack a doctrine how to treat
unilateral decisions in absence of agreement.
The Second Welfare Theorem and water pricing
The purpose of discussing this particular model is to arrive at water prices, money trans-
9Busch and Wen (1995) and Houba (1997) assume 1 = 2. As pointed out in Houba and Wen (2006a,c),
the current bargaining literature on endogenous disagreement points under 1 6= 2 contains serious technical
di¢ culties.
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fers and transfers of property rights through taxation. The interesting case assumes the non-
trivial case in which the disagreement point corresponds to absolute territorial sovereignty:
d = (b1 (e1) ; b2 (e2)). Application of the modied program (3) yields the single convex pro-
gram
max
sd;(x1;x2;qx1 ;qx2 ;tx1 ;tx2);(y1;y2;qy1 ;qy2 ;ty1 ;ty2)
(s1   d1) (s2   d2)1  ;
s.t.
s1  b1 (x1) + tx1 (1)
s2  b2 (y2) + ty2 (2)
(1  1) d1 + 1s1  b1 (y1) + ty1; (1)
(1  2) d2 + 2s2  b2 (x2) + tx2 ; (2)
x1  e1 + qx1 ; (px1)
x2  e2 + qx2 ; (px2)
tx1 + t
x
2  0; (px3)
y1  e1 + qy1 ; (py1)
y2  e2 + qy2 ; (py2)
ty1 + t
y
2  0; (py3)
qx1 + q
x
2  0; (x)
qy1 + q
y
2  0; (y)
where all Greek symbols between brackets denote shadow prices. As in Section 4, we only
discuss country 1s SSPE proposal (x1; x2; qx1 ; q
x
2 ; t
x
1 ; t
x
2). The part of the rst-order conditions
involving the partial derivatives of these six variables (maintaining the stated order) are given
by
1b
0
1 (x1)  px1 = 0;
2b
0
2 (x2)  px2 = 0;
px1   x = 0;
px2   x = 0
1   px3 = 0;
2   px3 = 0:
Solving these equations yields
px1 = p
x
2 = p
x
3b
0
1 (x1) = p
x
3b
0
2 (x2) > 0; (12)
22
because utility is strictly increasing in money and, therefore, px3 > 0. Due to specicities of
the model, we obtain the special case of a uniform water price for each location. From (12)
we observe that only relative prices matter and we may take money as the numeraire by
dividing all shadow prices by px3 , where we denote the normalized (uniform) water price as
pxw = p
x
1=p
x
3 . Assuming that the bargaining problem is essential, i.e., Pareto improvements
exist as depicted in Figure 1, the total gains from bilateral river basin management are
maximized if the upstream country is willing to trade some of its water for money. Since
also all shadow prices are positive, we must have that all constraints are binding, including
e¢ cient river production. So, qx1 = x1  e1 < 0 and qx2 =  qx1 > 0 implies x2 = e1+ e2 x1 >
e2. Furthermore, b01 (x1) = b
0
2 (x2) in (12) implies that the joint surplus b1 (x1) + b2 (x2) is
maximized in this SSPE proposal and, hence, x1 coincides with the unique maximizer of the
right-hand side of (11), as could be expected. Finally, tx1 + t
x
2 = 0 and q
x
1 + q
x
2 = 0 imply that
aggregate spending equals aggregate income pxw (x1 + x2) = p
x
w (e1 + e2). Similar properties
hold for country 2s SSPE proposal and, in particular, yi = xi for both i = 1; 2.
According to the Second Welfare Theorem, country is pre-tax income pxwei and its ex-
penditure or after-tax income is equal to mxi  pxwxi+ txi . Acting as a price-taking consumer,
country i spends its income on water consumption and monetary liquidity by solving:
(xi; t
x
i ) 2 argmax
zi;ti
ui (zi; ti) ; s.t. pxwzi + ti  mxi ; (13)
which yields @ui(xi;ti)
@xi
= b0i (xi) = p
x
w and
@ui(xi;ti)
@ti
= 1. Note that b0i (xi) is also country
is marginal rate of substitution between water and money and it is equal to the relative
price pxw=1. The monotonic preferences imply the budget constraint is binding. Country
1 receives the amount of money tx1 =  tx2 > 0 for its delivery of e1   x1 to country 2.
This implies a unit price of water of (e1   x1) =t1 that is unrelated to do prices related to
marginal costs and benets. Note that it does not matter whether ti represents money or
some consumption good from which the countries obtain utility. Since the SSPE proposal is
individually rational, we obtain that txi  bi (ei)   bi (xi) > 0 for both i = 1; 2. Summation
of these inequalities shows a nonempty range of t1 that are feasible, because tx1 + t
x
2 = 0 and
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b1 (e1) + b2 (e2)  b1 (x1)  b2 (x2) is negative.
Next, consider producer 1 with its constant-returns-of-scale river production technology.
Producer 1s prot under price-taking is equal to 0, because he buys input q1 = x1   e1 < 0
against price pxw and sells exactly this amount at exactly the same price to country 2. We
refer to Albersen et al. (2003) for an example of non-trivial nancial accounts based upon
shadow pricing associated with non-convex physical processes.
Although money is usually regarded as a special economic good, it is just one of the goods
in the economy, also according to the Second Welfare Theorem. This theorem provides an
interpretation of the allocation (x1; x2; qx1 ; q
x
2 ; t
x
1 ; t
x
2) in terms of market trade (or marginal
cost/benet pricing) against the price vector (pxw; p
x
w; 1) and a redistribution of property
rights equal to T ?i = p
x
wxi + 1  txi   pxwei, being the di¤erence between expenditure and pre-
tax income. Whether T ?i is positive or negative is an empirical matter. This redistributive
e¤ect consists of the combined value of net trade in water pxw (xi   ei) and the net trade
in money 1  (txi   0) that is opposite in sign. The negotiation outcome has two e¤ects: a
redistributive element and Pareto improving trade that is incorporated in the pre-tax market
income. Even though the initial rights in river basin management might be ill-dened, both
countries agree on a redistribution of wealth representing implicitly dened property rights
by establishing "new" property rights associated with (x1; x2; qx1 ; q
x
2 ; t
x
1 ; t
x
2). Although the
shadow prices can be thought of to represent Walrasian equilibrium prices as if established
water markets are governed by the law of supply and demand, this interpretation assumes
the countries refrain from exercising market power.
In general, the Second Welfare Theorem deals with non-transferable utility instead of
transferable utility or money, as e.g., in Ambec and Sprumont (2002). For the bilateral case,
the transferable utility value of cooperation, denoted as v (1; 2), is equal to the right-hand side
of (10). The Pareto frontier is described by fi ((1  j) dj + jsj) = v (1; 2) (1  j) dj jsj.
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Then, direct application of program (2) yields
max
s1;s2
(s1   d1) (s2   d2)1  ;
s.t.
s1  v (1; 2)  (1  2) d2   2s2;
s2  v (1; 2)  (1  1) d1   1s1:
In this program, any reference to prices and marginal benets has vanished from the model
description. In this simple case, this crucial information can be retrieved from (10), but
for less transparent applications a holistic approach in physical variables as in e.g. Roemer
(1988) yields more information to policy makers.
Finally, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) suggest that rational countries should realize that
their joint maximal aspiration level is bounded by the maximum on the right-hand side of
(10) or (11) and propose the downstream incremental distribution that assigns the following
utility levels to the two countries s1 = d1 and s2 = v (1; 2)  d1 > d2. This solution coincides
with the SSPE outcome (in utilities) in the alternating o¤er model with disagreement point
associated to absolute territorial sovereignty and a bargaining weight  = 0 to country 1,
or in terms of the primitives either 1 = 0 or 2 = 1. The alternating-o¤ers perspective
indicates that it is very unlikely that this axiomatic solution will prevail. Furthermore, even
at  = 0 the Second Welfare Theorem applies.
We conclude this section with a remark on stock variables.
Remark 2 Optimal river basin management includes the optimal release and recharge of
lakes and dams as reservoirs of water. Reservoirs would introduce stock variables to the
model. A reservoir can also be seen as a production process that produces "future" water
from "current" water and it can be represented as before by some production set Q. As an
illustration, reinterpret z1, respectively, z2 as water at present and in the future, say the wet
and dry season. Then, the reservoir produces future water q2 from present water q1 as input
and, under absence of evaporation, we have q1 + q2  0 and q1  0 as before. Then q1 is the
end stock of period 1 and q2 the initial stock at period 2.
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6 Concluding Remark
This contribution deals with the two points of fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992)
that alienate game theory from the language and concerns of policy makers: Easy to im-
plement solutions that are based upon common notions of water pricing; and insight in the
gains and losses for every stakeholder from policy reforms toward e¢ cient river basin man-
agement. For bilateral negotiations modeled as alternating-o¤ers, as pioneered in Rubinstein
(1982), a powerful computational innovation in a physical representation of real-world issues
is available that simultaneously allows for an interpretation of water prices as Walrasian
equilibrium prices, which is a direct consequence of the Second Welfare Theorem. Unfortu-
nately, the utility representation in Game Theory washes away any notion of water prices
from the physical model, as illustrated in Section 5. The physical model can be regarded
as the popular AGE framework that allows for further di¤erentiation of water users, water
related production and consumption goods by time (within the hydrological cycle), by space
and uncertainty about extreme whether conditions (droughts and oodings), although the
latter would assume the existence of contingent contracts and a discrete number of events.
Identifying water prices as Walrasian equilibrium prices should not be mistaken as naively
suggesting to decentralize decisions through water markets. For that to be the best policy
recommendation, it should be made clear rst that all participants on these markets do not
posses signicant market power. For river basin management, also the role of governments
is crucial even in case these do not trade themselves on the water market, because upstream
countries might initiate development of plans for, say, expanding the area under irrigation
a¤ecting future downstream ows.
Although this paper identies a promising route for further developing tools for water
policy research, the bilateral case is just a rst step. Future research should rst of all be
directed to deal with coalition formation among countries or among di¤erent stakeholder
within and across countries. Also the issue of regulating water markets when some the
parties have market power is a relevant issue. As in all areas of economic policy, lobbying is
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a matter of related interest. The bilateral model in Houba (2005a) captures such negotiations
in which the (exogenously given) probability of success in lobbying means a higher probability
to propose during the negotiations. This model reduces to the standard alternating-o¤ers
model after a transformation of the probabilities of becoming the proposer into modied
discount factors and, therefore, the approach advocated in this contribution also applies.
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